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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
ELIZABE'TH JtONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
HORMAN'S, INC., a Utah
corporation, ALLEN BT'EEL
COM'PANY, a Utah corporation,
JOHN DOE, and
RICHARD ROE,
Defendants-Respondents

Case No. 9956

BRIEF OF DEFE'NDANT-RESPONDENT
ALLEN S'TE'EL COMPANY
STATEMENT OF 'THE NATU~RE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries.
DfSPOSITION IN LOWER CO'URT
The Lower Court granted a Summary J udgment in favor of the Defendant..:Resporrdents, Horman's, Inc. and Allen Steel Company.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendant, Allen Steel Company, wants
the Judgment of the Lower Court affirmed.
STATEMEN·T OF MATERIA:L FACTS
The Plaintiff-Appellant's Statement of Facts
may be misleading to this court.
The Defendant-Respondent, Allen Steel Com1
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pany, moved for a Summary Judgment in its favor
based on the pleadings and depositions of the plaintiff and the plaintiff's husband, Julius Jones (R.
31). The order of the court granting Summary
Judgment in favor of each defendant ('R. 4'2) shows
the court read the depositions of plaintiff and plaintiff's husband. The court was furnished the defendant, Allen Steel Company's copy of the depositions,
and no place in the record is it shown that counsel
for the Plaintiff-Appellant requested that the originals be published and read. Orally at the hearing
on fue Motion for 'Summary Judgment and in the
Plaintiff-Appellant's reply to the Memoranda of
each Defendant-Respondent, the plaintiff admitted
the truth of the facts stated in the 'Memoranda of
eacJ:t Defendant-Respondent (R. 64).
The defendant, Horman's, Inc., is a general
contracting 'Company which w.as engaged in building an .addition to the Towne House Athletic Club,
at 158 South Third East, Salt Lake City, on March
2'7, 196'2. 'The Defendant-Re'Spondent, Allen 'Steel
Company, was the steel company which was engaged
in fabricating and erection of steel a:s a subcontractor at the job site. (R. 57). Horman's, Inc. was
the general cont~actor with the owner Towne House
Athletic Club, and Allen Steel Company was the
subcontractor with Horman's Inc. (R. 5'7').
'The plaintiff, Elizabeth Jones, is the wife of
Julius Earl Jones. On March 2'7, 19'6'2 Julius Earl
Jones visited a Mr. Hoffine, the masonry subcon2
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tractor under Horman's, Inc. at another job site
at Albertson's Market at 3rd South and 4th East
and inquired from Mr. Hoffine about receiving employment, and was allegedly ·told that as soon as
the steel was up on the Towne House job, Mr. Hoffine would prdbably he able to use Mr. Jones on
that project.
Mr. Julius Jones, the husband of the pla:intiff,
did not talk to any employee of Allen Steel Oompany
prior to going on the job site, and never talked to
any employee of Horman's, Inc. before going on the
job site.
On March 27, 1'962 Mr. Jones ·observed beams
being unloaded from a truck at the Towne House
site, and on the evening of the accident after all
work was shut down (R. 58) at about 7:30 P.M.
when no workmen were upon the jo'b site, and the
only persons present upon the job site were the
plaintiff and the plaintiff's husband, they went upon
the property.
At this time the beams were laying east to
west in the bottom ·of a ramp which ran up from the
basement of •the Towne House to the west. 'The steel
beams were long enough so that the west end of
each beam stuck out of the end of the ramp and
above the surface of the ground, and it w.as in 'the
area west of the ramp where the plaintiff was
seated by her husband on a cinderblock ( R. 58).
While the plaintiff was on the Towne House
3
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Athletic property, the steel beams tipped over, and
allegedly the plaintiff was injured.
This accident happened at 7:30 P.M. March
2'7, 1962 on a construction site when no work was
in progress. The accident happened at dusk in the
daylight.
In the complaint (R. 1) the plaintiff did not
allege that she was .a business visitor or invitee
upon the premises. At the Pretrial ( R. 3'5) the
court gave the plaintiff five days to file a Statement of Facts, and the entree order on May 8, 1963
fails 'to show (R. 35) that plaintiff w.as ever given
permission to file the Amended Complaint which
constitutes R. 36 of the Record.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE PLAINTIFF WAS
NOT AN INVITE'E.

The nature of use "to which land and prdperty
is put is often sufficient to express to the reasonable understanding of the public or classes or members thereof the willingness of a person to be received as an invitee or 'business visitor.
1

Is it customary for prospective workmen to
take their wives to job sites after progress on the
construction has shut down for the day? Was any
econom'ic benefit bestowed upon the Defendant- Respondent, Allen Steel Company by the plaintiff go4
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ing on the project at 7:30P.M. after work had ceased
at the construction job site?
The plaintiff admits that neither Horman's,
Inc. nor Allen Steel Company nor any of their employees invited her to enter or remain upon the
land (R. 59). Further, (R. 60) it is admitted that
this accident occurred after project hours at a con~truction job site at a time when the defendant had
no knowledge of the plaintiff's presence or opportunity to consen't or object to her presence.
Prosser on Torts, Second Edition, page 4'52 defines an invitee as follows:
"An invitee is a pers·on who is invited
to enter or remain on land for the purpose of
the occupier. Some courts require that the
business upon which she comes be pecuniary
in nature, or of some economic benefi't to the
possessor; others require only that it be such
that there is an implied representation, that
care ·has been exercised to make the land safe
for the visitor.
'~The possessor is required to exercise
reasonable care to warn the invitee, or to make
the premises safe for him, as to dangerous
conditions or activities of which the possessor
knows or those which he should discover with
reasonable care. The obligation exists only
while the visitor is upon the part of ·the premises to which his invitation extends."
The Allen Steel Company had no interest, economic or otherwise, in performance of the masonry
"-ork on this project. The masonry work was some5
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thing to be done on the premises after the steel erection was completed by Allen Steel Oompany, and
Allen Steel Company employees had left the premises.
What authority did the masonry contractor
have to invite the plaintiff's husband upon the premises- when the premises were not even ready for
him .to perform his subcontract work?
'The Restatement of Torts, Section 33·2, defines
business visitor as follows:
''A business visitor is a person who is
invited or permitted to enter or remain on l'and
in the possession 'Of another for a purpose
directly or indirectly connected with the business dealings between them."
Under Com'ment H, Section '3'3'2, Restatement
of Torts, the following comment is made:
'·'A person may be a business visitor of
the lessor of land although he is merely a gratuitous licensee of the lessee. 'Thus, a lessor
of an appartment in an apartment house or
an office in an office building, who retains
the control of the halls, stairways, and other
approaches to the apartment or office has a
business interest in the use of these facilities
by any person whom his lessee may choose
to admit, irrespective of whether the visit of
such a person is for his own or the lessee's
business purpose, or whether he comes as a
mere social guest or other gratuitous licensee
of the tenant."
Obviously, the fact that Mr. Jones could have
been an invitee df Mr. Hoffine in going on the pre6
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mises does not prove that he was an invitee or that
his wife was an invitee of the Allen Steel Company.
The case of Hayward vs. Downing, (1948) 112
Utah 508, 189 P. 2d 442 is of no assistance to the
plaintiff, as in that case certain ticket holders from
Bountiful, Utah were given permission to watch a
fight from a platform and they admittedly paid for
this privilege, and then during the course of the
progress of the fight the platform collapsed and they
were injured. Obviously, that case is different from
this case in that they paid the price and were given
a direct invitation and permission to use the p1atform.
In Mills vs. H eidingsfield (1'9 39) -La. App. ____ ,
192 S. 786 where a plaintiff went on a porch at a
house for the purpose of inquiring as to future
vacancy of the residence, and it was not disclosed
the premises had ever been advertised for occupancy,
it was held as a matter of la:w the plaintiff was a
mere licensee.
In Mortgage Commission Servicing Corp. vs.
Brock, (19'39) 60 Ga. App. 69·5, 4 S.E. 2d 669, where
a realtor advertised in a Sunday newspaper giving
the number and location of an apartment which was
for rent and where the plaintiff visited the apartment unaccompanied by the realtor and without
previously communicating to the realtor, the advertisement was held to not constitute an implied
invitation, and plaintiff was held not to be an invitee.
1

1

1

7
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In Amerioan Ry. Express Co. vs. Gilbreath,
C1931) 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, 48 F. 2d 809,
where the plaintiff, a la;borer, entered a storage
building and fell into an unguarded elevator shaft
after a man in the front office building said, "Go
back and see him," it was held there was no apparent authority to give an invitation to the plaintiff
and that he was not an invitee.
What apparent authority did Mr. Hoffine have
to invite prospective masonry employees on this
project when he was not even working at the job
site?
In Gowen vs. Davis (1963) ____ Ida. ____ 377 P.
2d 950, where the ·plaintiff, a bystander watching
a truck being loaded wi~th a balled evergreen shrub
observed the front end of the truck go off the ground,
as the load was put in the rear, !and voluntarily
climbed onto a fender to assist 'in holding the front
o'f the truck down, and thereafter was injured when
the truck sprung up, the plain tiff was held as to
the persons loading the truck to be a licensee only.
1

In Eddy vs. John J. Brady Pklstering Company
(1961) 1'11 Ohio App. 190, 1'71 N.E. 2d 7;2'2, where
a heating subcontractor's employee, who was using
a plastoring sc'affold, conferred n~o !benefit or mutual advantage upon the plastering subcontractor,
the em·ployee was held to be a mere licensee, and
the scaffold owner did not owe such employee a
duty of reasonable care to see that the scaffold was
8
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safely constructed, and the plastering subcontractor
was held not liable for the injury suffered by the
employee of the heating subcontractor when the scaffold collapsed as the employee was attempting to
move it for his own use in carrying out his own
work.
In Dishingham vs. A. W. Kuettel and Sons, Inc.
(1959) 255 Minn. 3'25, 9'6 N.W. 2d 6'84, where a
hospital engineer was ordered 'by his superintendent
to read the hosp ital steam condensate meters located
in a sub~basemen t df a new wing under construction, and where it was shown that in the area where
the plaintiff was injured the premises were under
the control of the metal su!bcorrtrtactor and that there
was no economic benefit, mutual or otherwise, it
was held that the plaintiff, when he entered to read
such meters, was neither a ''''business visitor" nor an
"invitee" but a mere gratuitous licensee.
In Brauner vs. Leutz (194'3) 29'3 Ky. 406, 169
S.W. 2d 4, a case which is sometimes indicated as
being the leading case with some text writers, where
an independent painting contractor, to prime a cornice, was granted consent of an independent carpenter ·contractor to occupy a scaffold constructed by
the carpenter to put on the cornice, and when while
doing so, the scaffold collapsed, the court held that
the status of the parties was licensor-licensee and
not master and servant or invitor and invitee, notwithstanding the custom for independent contractors to appropriate others equipment and facilities
on the scene of the building construction, as there
1

9
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was no invitation or economic benefit bestowed on
the ·carpenter contractor by the painting contractor.
In Michigan in Munson vs. Vane-Stecker Company, ·('t9 57) 79 N.W. 2d 855, 347 Mich. 377, the
court said in determining whether a steel contractor
using a scaffold of another contractor was a licensee
or an invitee, the test is whether there existed a mutual interest and mutual advantage to the parties
concerned for the use of equipment belonging to one
party and used by another.
In a Federal case in Dillingham vs. Nick Douglas Company, (19 59) 2'61 Fed. 2d 26'7, where the
court granted a pre-emptory instruction in favor
of the defendant independent contractor, it was
said that where the independent contractor's employee was injured in a fall from a scaffold which
was defective because of a knot in a cross timber
which was part of a warehouse which was utilized
by the employee for the support of a scaffold during
the installation of a sprinkler system, that the employee was a mere licensee on the cross timber and
that the owner's responsibility was only to alert
the employee o'f any peril positively known to them.
In Arthur vs. StJandard Engineering Company,
(19'51) 1'93 Fed. '2d 903, 89 U.S. App. D.C. 399,
32 A.L.R. 2d 408, where the electrical subcontractor's employee sued steam fitting subcontractor for
injuries sus~a'ined when steam fitting subcontractor's
scaffolding broke while plaintiff was upon it, the
trial court was affirmed in holding that as a matter
of 1aw the plaintiff was a licensee and not an invi tee.
1

1

1
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Further in A'rthur vs. Standard Engineering Compa.ny, supra., the court said that even though the
general custom existed whereby scaffolds and ladders were built by one subcontractor and were used
by employees of other subcontractors, that custom
did not make the employee of the electrical subcontractor an invitee of the steam fitting subcontractor,
as evidence showed as a matter of law steam fitting
subcontractor had no interest and derived no financial 'benefit or advantage of any work done by
the electrical contractor and there was no mutual
benefit in having employees of the electrical subcontractor use the scaffolds.
No where in the appellant's brief does 'the appellant say what financial, economic advantage, mutual or otherwise, the Allen Steel Company derived
from having the plaintiff's husband go upon the job
site.
It may have been of some mutual interest and
financial advantage to Horman's, Inc. to have the
masonry contractor obtain employees to do the masonry subcontract work, but since this work was not
to be done until the steel er~tion was completed, it
is equally obvious there was no mutual business
interest or advantage to Allen Steel Company 'to have
the masonry con tractor or any of his employees or
any prospective employees of the masonry contractor
upon the job site prior to the completion of the
erection.
Even if it should be decided or assumed for the
1

11
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sake of argument that Mr. Julius Jones was an invitee, there is no reason why the plaintiff should
enjoy the same status.
Is it the custom for women to accompany their
husbands to construction job sites? Further, is it
the custom for women to vi,sit with prospective employees job sites where their husbands are looking
for work, particularly after work has ceased for
the day(
The cases which plaintiff cites in support of
her contention that she was an invitee are hardly
in point. In Brigman vs. Fiske-Garter Construction
Company (19'2'6) 1'9'2 N.C. 791, 136 S.E. 12'5, 49
A.-L~R. 773 where the plaintiff went upon the premises of the defendall!t company with her husband
who had been expressly invited to come upon the
premises to seek employment and where she was
injured while sitting in a car parked in the parking
lot, the court us-ed language to· indicate that she was
an implied invitee. IThe Brigman case, supra., involves active and not passive negligence. In regard
to- active negligence, a possessor of land is subject
to liability to both licensees and business visitors.
In Section 341, Restatement of Torts, the rule is
stated as follows :
''A possessor of land is subject to liability
to licensees, whether business visitors or gratuitous licensees, for bodily harm caused to
them by his failing to carry on his activities
with reasonable care for their safety, unless
the licensees knows or from facts known to
1

1
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them, should know the possessors activities
and of the risk involved fuerein."
In the Brigman case, supra., the wife was sitting in the husband's car while it was parked in
the parking lot where he had been invited to leave
it, and the defendant actively backed a truck into
the car injuring the plaintiff and damaging the
car. The difference and the distinguishing point between the Brigman case, supra., and this case is
that the Brigman case involved active negligence,
and this case involves passive negligence only.
'The case of Fortune vs. Southern Railroad Company ('1909) '1'50 N.C. 695, 64 S.E. 75 9 would not appear to be in point and is easily distinguishable. Obviously, there is an implied invitation to go down
and meet the train or go out to the .airport and
meet the plane, and persons using terminal facilities to meet passengers are true invitees. But at
what construction site is it customary for the wife
to go and look over the status of the work or the
progress of the job after working hours? Is there
any economic benefit bestowed upon Allen Steel
Company by having the plaintiff in 1fuis case visit
the job site prior to the time the plaintiff's prospective employer begins his work and at a time when
no workmen were present?
Kalus vs. Bass (1916) 12·2 Md. 4·6'7, 89 Atl.
731 is hardly in point. In this case a husband was
invited by express invitation to inspect some rooms
for possible tenancy and took with him his son who
1

13
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was going to be a joint tenant of the premises, and
while visiting the premises a stairway collapsed.
Obviously, since the premises had to please the members of the family as wen as the father, there was
an implied invitation for an of the family to inspect them. What man doesn't take his family or
older children with him when looking for a house,
but how often, if ever before, have we ever heard of
a prospective workman taking his wife to a prospective job site?
It does not seem that the right to enter the
premises during working hours for an inspection
gives any consent or right to go on the premises
after work for the day has ceased. If Mr. Jones had
any right to go on the premises to inspect the status
of the work in progress, it would appear that he
should have exercised that right while workmen
were upon the job and before the closing hour. Further, it would seem that as a reasonable man, he
had no need to enter any portion of the premises,
as from the sidewalk or the street, it would have
been obvious the steel beams were not in pltace and
that masonry construction was not about to start
immediately, and that there was no reasonable excuse on his part for going on the premises to view
the status of obviously incomplete steel erection.
In New Jersey in Liveright vs. Max Lijsitz
Furniture Company, (19 36) 117 N.J. 24'3, 187, Atl.
5'83 the owner of a furniture store was held not
' to a furniture salesman for injuries received
liable
1

14
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by the salesman when the salesman attempted to
enter an unlighted toilet after having used the furniture store's ~telephone for his own personal telephone
call, and where the toilet was not open for the public, and where there was no suggestion that the toilet
was maintained for 1fue accommodation of store
customers. In other words if you go on a part of
the premises where you wouldn't reasonably be expected, it relieves your status of an invitee and
you become a licensee merely.
- I n Massachusetts in McNamarra vs. MacLean
(19'39) 302 Mass. 4'2'8, 19 N.E. 2d 544 where the
plaintiff received permission to use a toilet but was
told that this toilet was only for the use of the employees, and where 'it was difficult to enter because
of a trap door, and where the pl'aintiff was in'jured
when she fell from a stairway below the trap door,
she was held to be an invitee in tfue store, but a licensee only in using the stairway going down from
the trap door to the toilet.
Bird vs. Cloverleaf-Harris Dairy ( 194'2) 102
Utah 330, 125 P. '2d '79'7, is 'in my opinion the contl·olling case. In this case where Montell Bird, son
of the plaintiff, and a milk tester employed by
Federated Milk Producers, parked his father's automobile under a canopy in front of the garage doors
at the Cloverleaf-Harris Dairy when he knew that
a regular parking lot was provided for the use of
customers and employees in parking illieir cars, and
where the son thought the garage would not be used
15
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during the time his father's car was left at thlat
location, and where other employees parked beneath
the canopy but did not block the entran~e to the
garage, and where the canopy feU on 1fu.e plaintiff's
car, and where the court assumed that canopies
did not fall in the aJbsenfCe of negligence, and t}liat
negligence existed, this court said the plaintiff could
not re'cover as the liability of the owner extended
no further than the ivi tation and that the plaintiff
was a licensee only. In Bird vs. Cloverleaf-Harris
Dairy, supra., the court sa:id it would not be ordinary and customary to park so as to block 'the entrance to the garage, and as such, in parking in that
location, the plaintiff was a licensee. Further, the
court said in Bird vs. Clov,erleaf-Harris Dairy, supra., the only duty owed to a licensee was not to willfully or wantonly damage the licensee's property.
I submit the Bird case, supra., is in point, and
that it would not be ordinary and customary to take
your wife to a Job site at '7 :30 'P.M. after work has
ceased any more than it would be to park your
father's car in an area not designated for public
parking.
In summary it is submitted the plaintiff is not
an invitee for the following reasons:
1. The plaintiff was not on a part of the premises Where it would be ordinary and customary
to expect her.
2. 'The plaintiff was not on the premises at
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a time when it would be ordinary and customary
to expect here.

3.

3. She entered a job site where construction
was in progress.
4. She had had no implied or apparent 'invitation to enter the job site.

I.

d..

5. There was no reason for the plaintiff's
husband to go on the job site when he could observe
from the street the steel had not been erected and
the proje·ct was not ready for masonry work to pro.

~e~

6. No economic benefit was bestowed upon the
Allen Steel Company by the entry of the plaintiff
or the plaintiff's husband on the job site.

J/-

7. There was no 'business relationship of any
nature between the plaintiff's husband and the defendant, Allen Steel Company.
~ Q'I/\;C-l"'
It is submitted that as a matter of law all reasonable men would agree under the existing facts
illle plaintiff was a mere licensee·· only.
POI'NT II.
ALLEN STEEL COMfPANY owgn NO DUTY TO
l\IAKE TffiS JOB SITE SAFE FOR THE PLAINTIFF.

While generally a possessor of land is required
to exercise reasonable care to warn the invitee, or
to make the premises safe for him as to dangerous
condi·tions or activities o'f which the possessor knows,
or those which he could discover with reasonable
17
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care, this is not an absolute rule, and if the general
obligation exists, it exists only while the visitor is
upon a part of the prem'ises to Which his invitation
extends. Sometimes it is said that an invitee going
on a construction job site accepts the premises in
their then existing condition and has no right to
require the possessor to modify, change, or otherwise prepare the premises for their entry.
In H elvich vs. Rutherford Company ·('t95'3)
96 Ohio App. '367, 114 N.E. '2d 514, we have an indication of what duty is owed to anyone on a construction job site. In Helvich vh. Rutherford Company, supra., where the watchman entered the leased
premises while work was shut down during the
course of construction on a Saturday afternoon to
lead the plumber to a water leak, ~and fell from a balcony without a railing which had been removed to
facilitate construction in progress, the court said:
"*- * * when a property is under construction,
there are, of necessity, hazards created as the
work progr~sses which are only eliminated
by its completion. Anybody who goes upon
such property with knowledge of it under
construction must meet with and guard himself against such natural and necessarily created dangers. A contractor is not compelled
in the exercise df ordinary care to guard
against such natural dangers after the work
of the day is over and the property is closed
for ordinary purposes to business visitors,
licensees, or frequentors."
In California in Coggins vs. Hanchette (19'59)
1
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---· Cal. ____ , 338 P. 2d 379, Where a lady telephone
employed by the Pacific Telephone and
Telegraph Company fell on some m'astic in a hall
area in fue telephone building placed in the hall
by an independent con tractor's employee, the court
said that the plaintiff was an inv!tee of the tile
contflactor, but the jury returned a verdict on behalf of the defendant, and the California Supreme
Court affirmed the following instruction :
"You are instructed that an invitee coming
upon the premises in the process of construction is invited to use the prem'ises in their then
condition. Put in another way the invitation
is merely to use the premises in whatever
condition fuey are at the time of entry."

~upervisor

In Boucher vs. Amerioan Bridge Company,
(1950) 9'5 Cal. App. ·2'1, 659, '21'3 P. 2d 5'37, where
an employee of an electrical contractor brought an
action against American Bridge, an independent
contractor for steel erection, the court said ,a;s to
the owners, both the electrical contractor and the
steel contractor were invitees, and as to each other
they were strangers between whom there was no
privity or contract, and as such, they owed to the
employees of each such other the same duty of exercising ordinary care for their safety during progress of work as they owed to the public generally.
In other words, they owed no obligaltion 'to make the
job site safe for entry of each other's employees,
but would be liable for active negligence in injurying eaCh other's employees.
19
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R·estatemerrt of 'Torts, Section 3'42 ~provides
as follows:

''A possessor of land is subject to liability for
bodily harm caused to gratuitous licensees by
a natural or artificial condition thereof if
but only if, he:
'
(.a) knows of the condition and realizes

that it involves an unreasonable risk
to them and 'has reason to beHeve that
they· will not discover the condition
or realize the risk, and
(b) invites or permits them to enter or
remain upon the land, without exercising reasonable care
( i) 'to make the condition reasonably
safe, or
( ii) to warn them of the conditions
and the risk involved."
Our court approved of the foregoing Section
of the Restatement of Torts and adopted the S'ame
ruling in Wood vs. Wood, 8 Utah 2d 2 79, 33'3 P. 2d
630 ( 195'9).
In this case the admitted statement ~of facts
and depositions show that the Allen Steel Company
did not know of the condition involved and that it
did not 'invite or permit the plaintiff to remain upon
the land after discovering the condition and the risk
involved.
In fact, the evidence in the record is conclusive
to the fact that the dangerous condition was never
discovered by the defendant, Allen Steel Company,
or any of its employees.
1

1

1
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POINT Ill.
W~NTON MISCONDU,CT W ~S NOT AN ISSUE
PRESENTED IN THE LOWE'R COURT .A:ND SHOULD
NOT BE CONSIDEREn BY THIS COURT.

'The plaintiff's Com~plaint does not allege willful or wanton misconduct ( R. 1). 'The Amended
Complaint which the plaintiff filed (R. 36) did not
allege any wanton or willful misconduct.
Not 'having alleged wanton misconduct or wanton conduct on the part of the Allen 'Steel Company,
it would appear that ·the Allen 'Steel Company had
no reason to deny wanton conduct, and certainly the
plaintiff has no reason ~o complain because the
court did not consider a theory not considered by the
plaintiff in the plaintiff's Complaint or Amended
Complaint. In Tyges.en vs. Magna Water Company
(1962) 13 Utah 2d 39'7, '3'7'5 P. 2d 456, this court
held that a puint may not he raised for the first
time on appeal.
In any event what occurred here w.as not willful misconduct. In Milligan vs. Harward ( 1960),
where an action was brought against the driver
after he lost control of nis car while reaching for
a cigarette, this court defined willful misconduct,
and in Milligan vs. Harward, supra., said:
"Harward's act in reaching for the cigarette cannot be construed as willful misconduct. Willful misconduct is 'the intentional
doing of an act or intentionally omitting or
failing to do an act, with knowledge that
serious injury is a probable and not merely
1

1
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a possibl~ result, or the intention~,! doing of
an act with wanton and reckless dis,regard of
the possible consequences. Willful misconduct
cannot he predica:ted upon the mere inadvertence or even gross negligence."
Certainly, since 'Allen Steel ·Company did not
know of the danger of the beams falling over and
did not know of the plaintiff's presence on the premiges after working hours, and had no reason in
the exercise of due care 'to expect that she would
go on the premises, and become injured, there is ana
was no willful miscondu~t under the facts of this
case.
'POINT IV.
AS A MA'TTER OF LAW THE ALLEN STEE'L
COMPA!NY DrD NOT KNOW OF A 'DANGEROUS CONDITION ON 'THE PR'EMIJ'SES, AND 'HAD NO 'REASON
TO 'BELIEVE THE ICONU'ITION, 'EVEN IiF KNOWN,
WOUJ.JD INVOLVE AN UNRE·ASONABL'E RISK TO
THE PIJA]N'TTFF.

'The plaintiff-appellant admits Allen Steel Company did not, directly ·or impliedly, invite Julius
Jones to enter the premises, ( R. S7, R. 58, 'and R.
64) . 'This plaintiff went on the premises With her
husband at 7 :'30 P.M. in the ·evening after work on
the project had closed for the day and when no workmen were present. Neither she nor her husband
had sought the permission of Allen Steel Company
to enter the pre:mises, and 'there was no reason for
the plaintiff or her husband to enter the premises,
as a visual inspection of the work in progress would
1
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show that the steel erection had not been completed
and tha:t masonry work was not about to start.
In Wood vs. Wood, ( 1'95'9) 8 U·tah 2d '279, 333
P. 2d 630, where the plaintiff visited her daughterin-law's home to pick up some wedding invitations
and ·entered the House through a garage door and
fell down a darkened stairwell tHa t she had temporarily forgotten a;bout, our ~court said the duty owed
to 'a license was limited to refrain from willfu1ly
injuring and from perm'i tting conditions to exist
which might be considered a 'trap, and that a guest
cannot heedlessly enter into darkness in an unknown
area and then complain of the danger encountered.
In Tempest vs. Richa~dson ( 1'915'6) 5 Utah 2d
174, 29'9 P. 2d 124, where the pl aintiff entered the
defendant's home as an invited guest and was unfamiliar with its construction, and wher·e while going to the bathroom opened a door and entered a
darkened area without first ascertaining whether
it was safe to do so, and where she fell down a
stairway in ~he darkened .area, it was he~d that the
host was not liable.
Further, it would appear that if an invited
social guest or member of the family who has an
implied invitation 'to enter cannot recover, that there
is no duty owed to a woman who enters a constructi'On job site where she is unfamiliar with conditions,
and that Mrs. Jones who heedles8ly and thoughtlessly entered the cons1truction area, can now not
complain of fue dangers she encountered.
1

1
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It is submitted that if Mrs. Jones has any right
to complain, the owner and possessor of property is
a guarantor of the safety of anyone entering without the owner or possessor's consent, and that as
long as a person goes on propel'lty without giving
the owner or possessor a chance to object, the owner
or possessor will be liable. Manifestly, a burden of
this type should not be impressed upon the owner
or possessor.
CON'CLUSION
'The judgment of illle Lower Court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYMOND M. BERRY
Attorney for
Defendant-Respondent
Allen Steel Company
203 Executive Building
45'5 East Fourth 'South
Salt Lake City, Utah
I her~by certify that on this ---------------- day of
September, 1963, I mailed two copies of this Brief
by United States mail, postage prepaid, to John E.
Stone and Robert C. Cummings, and two copies to
Ray, Quinney, and Nebeker and Stephen B. Nebeker
at the addresses shown on this Brief.
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